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Defendant, a city engaged in supplying water to its inhabitants, was sued by
plaintiff, a consumer, for injuries resulting from plaintiff's drinking of leadpoisoned water at a faucet in his home. The water, although pure at the meter,
became poisoned when passing through a lead pipe inspected and approved by
the water company but owned by the plaintiff. Plaintiff brought his action on
two different theories: (1) on implied warranty; (2) in negligence. The
trial court instruct~d the jury without exception or objection from defendant
that they might find for plaintiff, under either of these theories. The defendant
was successful in the trial court, but plaintiff appealed on the ground that he
was entitled to have the jury instructed to the effect that, although the sale
was made at the water meter, the defendant was liable to furnish wholesome
and pure water at the faucet. Held, since defendant failed to except to the
instructions of the trial court as to his liability on implied warranty, this
instruction became "the law of the trial," but since plaintiff was entitled to the
instructions he requested, the judgment must be reversed. Horton v. Inhabitants
of North Attleboro, (Mass. 1939) 19 N. E. (2d) 15.
Although the question of a public water company's 1 liability under an
implied warranty of the purity and wholesomeness of the water furnished its
customers did not have to be passed on in the principal case, the probability of

1 A municipality engaged in a water business has the same rights and liabilities as
a private corporation engaged in that business. Keever v. City of Mankato, 113 Minn.
55, 129 N. W. 158, 775 (1910); Lockwood v. Dover, 73 N. H. 209, 61 A. 32

(1905); 19 R. C. L. II30 (1917).

II2

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 38

such an issue being presented to the courts in the near future invites speculation
on its outcome. Now that the furnishing of water by a public water company
to a private consumer has been held a sale,2 the way seems clear for an application, in an appropriate case, of the doctrine of implied warranty. Since
"implied warranty'' has come to have two different meanings-( I) that of an
"obligation imposed by law as a matter of policy," and ( 2) a promise or representation unexpressed "but fairly and reasonably inferable from the facts," 8
·-the nature of the court's holding may depend upon which of these two interpretations plaintiff urges.4 If he relies upon the principle of arbitrarily imposed
liability evolved in the "food cases" 5 and justified upon the grounds of public
policy,6 the complaining consumer will be met with the opposing and firmly
established principle of public utilities law: that a public water company is not
an insurer of the purity and wholesomeness of water it supplies/ The significance
of this conflict of rules is apparent when it is remembered that the effect of the
modern decisions in the food cases holding the seller liable upon an "implied
warranty" is to force him into a position of insurer.8 The reason given for the
public utilities rule is also that of public policy.9 The problem of a court at this
stage would resolve itself into choosing between two opposing public policies,
and since there has been no clear,1° consistent, or convincing explanation 11 of
Canavan v. City of Mechanicville, 229 N. Y. 473, 128 N. E. 882 (1920).
Waite, "Retail Responsibility and Judicial Law Making," 34 MicH. L. REV.
494 at 498 (1936); Hoe v. Sandborn, 21 N. Y. 552 (1860).
4 The Uniform Sales Act was purposely omitted from this discussion because
section 15 has had no conclusive effect upon the common law. Waite, "Retail Responsibility and Judicial Law Making," 34 MICH. L. REV. 494 at 506 (1936); 90 A. L. R.
1270 (1934).
.
G WAITE, SALES, 2d ed., 224 (1938).
6 Chapman v. Roggenkamp, 182 III. App. 117 (1913); Race v. Krum, 222 N. Y.
410, 118 N. E. 853 (1918); Brown, "The Liability of Retail Dealers for Defective
Food Products," 23 MINN. L. REV. 585 at 596 (1939).
1 Boguski v. City of Winooski, 108 Vt. 380, 187 A. 808 (1936). Telephone,
telegraph, and radio companies do not insure the success of the performances which
they undertake. 4 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., 3182 (1936). The same is true
of electrical companies. Tri-City Ry. v. Killeen, 92 III. App. 57 (1900); Smith v.
East End Electric Light Co., 198 Pa. 19, 47 A. I 123 (1901); Pennsylvania R. R.
v. Lincoln Trust Co., 91 Ind. App. 28, 167 N. E. 721, 170 N. E. 92 (1929).
8 4 OHio ST. UNiv. L. J. 403 (1938); Parks v. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144
P. 202 (1914); 63 A. L. R. 340 (1929); 88 A. L. R. 534 (1934); 90 A. L. R.
1270 (1934).
9 Green v. Ashland Water Co., IOI Wis. 258, 77 N. W. 722 (1898); City of
Salem v. Harding, 121 Ohio St. 412, 169 N. E. 457 (1929); 5 A. L. R. 1402
(1920).
10 Waite, "Retail Responsibility and Judicial Law Making," 34 MICH. L. REV.
494 at 497, 518 (1936); WAITE, SALES, 2d ed., 227 ff. (1938).
.
11 Various explanations have been offered. It is arg~ed that such a rule would
result in the improvement of marketing conditions by forcing the elimination of unwholesome food products. VoLD, SALES 466 (1931). In Ward v. Great Atlantic &·
Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 120 N. E. 225 (1918), the court suggests that the
dealer must be held liable in order to give the consumer an effective remedy. Sec·
2
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the public policy relied upon in the food case decisions, a court would probably
accept the public ua1ities rule on the strength of a firmly established 12 and readily
comprehensible public policy.18 If, however, the aggrieved consumer was willing
and able to prove a promise or representation "fairly and reasonably inferable
from the facts," his chances of success against the water company would seem
to be greater. There appears to be nothing in the cases which would preclude
a water company from expressly warranting the purity and wholesomeness of
the water it supplies, and it would seem that a water company could do impliedly what it could do expressly in this respect. But still the plaintiff's success
could not be predicted with too great a degree of certainty. In the first place,
one cannot be too sure how much effect a court confronted with such facts as
we have outlined would give to the phrase, often found in text books, often
repeated in dicta and adhered to in cases not here in point, that "a public
water company is not an insurer or guarantor of the purity of water
it supplies." u But assuming that this presents no serious obstacle,
there remains a policy, or perhaps only an attitude, in the judicial mind that the
obligations of public corporations are today well defined.15 The scope of these
WAITE, SALES, 2d ed., 299, note 78 (1938). Professor Williston says, "if the manufacturer is held to an absolute liability irrespective of negligence, it will unquestionably increase the degree of care which he will use." 4 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev.
ed., 2733 (1936). Others have contented themselves with the assertion that public
safety demands seller's liability. Brown, "The Liability of Retail Dealers for Defective
Food Products," 23 MINN. L. REv. 585 at 595 (1939).
12
Canavan v. City of Mechanicville, 229 N. Y. 473, 128 N. E. 882 (1920);
Minneapolis General Electric Co. v. Cronon, (C. C. A. 8th, 1908) 166 F. 651.
18
"If municipalities ••• were held to respond in damages for all sickness and
death caused by water-borne diseases, municipal burdens would be increased to the
point where the municipalities would have to go out of existence." City of Salem
v. Harding, 121 Ohio St. 412 at 417, 169 N. E. 457 (1929). The court in Green
Y. Ashland Water Co., IOI Wis. 258 at 266-267, 77 N. W. 722 (1898), after
refusing to treat the furnishing of water by a utility company to its patrons as a sale,
continued: "To say that the person or corporation performing that service shall be
burdened with an implied warranty of quality of the thing carried and distributed .••
would burden such public service in a way that would be destructive of private enterprise ••• and render public enterprise in the same direction so attended with dangers
as to discourage a service that has become a necessity in all communities of any considerable size, and which promotes to a high degree the welfare and happiness of
individuals in communities great or small." See 5 CoRN. L. Q. 479 (1920) for a
public policy argument in favor of holding water companies liable under an implied
warranty.
H3 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs, 5th ed.,§ 1316 (1911); City of
Salem v. Harding, 121 Ohio St. 412, 169 N. E. 457 (1929); Hamilton v. Madison
Water Co., II6 Me. 157, 100 A. 659 (1917); Pennsylvania R. R. v. Lincoln Trust
Co., 91 Ind. App. 28, 167 N. E. 721 (1929); Canavan v. City of Mechanicville, 229
N. Y. 473, 128 N. E. 882 (1920); Green v. Ashland Water Co., 101 Wis. 258, 77
N. W. 722 (1898); 67 C. J. 1282 (1934).
15
It seems impossible to otherwise explain the hesitancy of the courts to imprue
new liabilities on public service corporations. Glennen v. Boston Elevated Ry., 207
Mass. 497, 93 N. E. 700 (19u). See 2 WYMAN, PUBLIC SERVICE CoRPORAT10Ns,
§ 977 (19u).
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obligations has been historically determined16 and all that seems to be required
of a public corporation is to refrain from negligence or wilful wrong.17 If the
company has exercised the proper degree of care under the circumstances,
recovery against it for injury suffered because of foreign substances or impurities in the water is uncertain, to say the least.
Edmund R. Blaske

16 I WYMAN, PuBLic SERVICE CoaPoRATIONs, § 333 ff. (19n); 2 ibid., §§ 961,
962. See also 4 W1LLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., 3170, note I (1936).
17 Pennsylvania R. R. v. Lincoln Trust Co., 91 Ind. App. 28, 167 N. E. 721
(1929); Hamilton v. Madison Water Co., II6 Me. 157, 100 A. 659 (1917);
Safransky v. City of Helena, 98 Mont. 456, 39 P. (2d) 644 (1936); Jones v. Mount
Holly Water Co., 87 N. J. L. 106, 93 A. 860 (1915); Hayes v. Torrington Water
Co., 88 Conn. 609, 92 A. 406 (1914); Campbell v. City of Helena, 92 Mont. 366,
16 P. (2d) 1 (1932); 5 A. L. R. 1402 (1920). In Green v. Ashland Water Co.,
IOI Wis. 258 at 267, 77 N. W. 722 (1898), the court says that if the law be
administered along lines holding the water company liable for negligence and deceit,
then "the safety of individuals, as affected by public water service, will be as well
promoted as is consistent with the continuance of such service••••"

